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Investment products, such as company shares and
government bonds, have always been an important item of
wealth, although traditionally limited to a minority or the elite of
society.1 Life insurance, which often performs an investment
function, permits many millions to participate indirectly in the
financial markets, as do pension products.2 However, it is
commonly said that life insurance is not bought and has to be
sold. That may be true of investments more generally, and the
role of financial intermediaries and salespersons has been critical
in persuading individuals of the wisdom of contributing to
pensions, investing in mutual funds, and making other
investments, as opposed to buying a bigger house or automobile.
In 2008, Lord Justice Rix in the English Court of Appeal
observed:
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1
See Stuart Banner, ANGLO-AMERICAN SECURITIES REGULATION: CULTURAL
AND POLITICAL ROOTS, 1690–1860, at 24 (1998) (discussing the rise of a securities
market in late seventeenth-century England and noting, “As the secondary market
in government debt and shares of businesses grew, the portion of the nation’s total
wealth consisting of land and other tangible things gradually declined, replaced
more and more by mobile pieces of paper, representations of intangible fractions of a
future stream of income. Within a generation, contemporaries came to realize that
an entirely new form of property had come into existence.”).
2
R in re Heather Moor & Edgecomb Ltd. v. Fin. Ombudsman Serv., [2008]
EWCA (Civ.) 642, [87] (Eng.).
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It is a feature of our commercial law, robust, pragmatic and
internationally respected as it may be, that it grew up in an age
of commerce between merchants, when what we now think of as
financial consumer contracts must have been relatively few in
number, limited in their scope, and entered into by a small
range of professional, mercantile and landowning people. I
speak of contracts outside ordinary sale of goods. Nowadays,
however, huge numbers of consumers have pensions, make
investments, and enter into insurance contracts of all kinds.3

The value added by financial intermediaries and
salespersons is recognized by the often sizeable commissions paid
by life insurers and other financial product providers to them
when a deal is done. Given that the legal position is that
independent financial intermediaries are the agents of investors,
and not the product providers, this has always been difficult to
reconcile with principles of fiduciary law. In particular, the
potential for a conflict of interest is obvious. One solution is a
regime of disclosure, although the extent of disclosure necessary
has been much debated. The United Kingdom appears to have
traditionally followed a disclosure model, at least for less
sophisticated retail customers.4
However, U.K.’s financial
regulator has resolved that, with effect from December 31, 2012,
the appropriate solution to the conflict risk is to ban outright all
payments by product providers to intermediaries.5 This Article
describes in a little more detail that step and how the U.K. got
there.
I.

A.

THE U.K. INDUSTRY, REGULATORY CONTEXT, AND
REGULATION OF INVESTMENT BUSINESS

The United Kingdom Financial Services Industry

The U.K. financial services industry constitutes a significant
component of its economy. It is composed of three main sectors:
banking, insurance, and investment business. Even in the wake
of the 2007–2008 financial crisis, the contribution of the financial

3

Id.
See, e.g., FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK ¶ 2.3.1
(2013) [hereinafter CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK].
5
See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: THE
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, 2011, Cm. 8083, ¶¶ 1.39.44 (U.K.) [hereinafter
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM].
4
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services industry to the U.K. economy was still significant.6
Financial services accounted for some eight percent of gross
domestic product (“GDP”) and they contributed some £38 billion
net to the U.K.’s balance of payments.7 Over one million people
are employed in the financial services industry in the U.K., a
third of them in London, but the remainder spread out across the
U.K., overall some five percent of the workforce.8 Over 24,500
separate firms constitute the regulated financial services
industry.9
B.

Financial Crises and Legislative Reaction

The U.K. experience of greater participation in modern
financial products has been far from a uniformly positive one.
Between 1988 and 1994, it was estimated that between one
million and two million ordinary investors were sold the wrong
type of pension.10 They were persuaded to opt out of, or not join,
occupational pension schemes, with deﬁned beneﬁts, and instead
take out an investment product-based pension usually offered by
life insurance companies. The latter involved greater exposure to
market risk and fewer beneﬁts than the occupational schemes.
Such investors faced a potentially signiﬁcant ﬁnancial loss. The
scale of the pension mis-selling scandal and its ﬁnancial extent
were unprecedented.11 The final estimated bill for compensation
exceeded £12 billion.12 What were the causes of mis-selling?

6
HM TREASURY, REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, 2009, Cm. 7667, ¶ 1.6
[hereinafter REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS].
7
Id.
8
Id. ¶¶ 1.6, 1.9. Compare these figures to the European Union average of 2.5%
of employment in the financial services sector. Commission of the European
Communities, Report from the Commission: Progress on Financial Services, at 3,
COM (2000) 336 final (May 30, 2000).
9
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE FINANCIAL CONDUCT AUTHORITY: APPROACH TO
REGULATION ¶ 1.10 (2011) [hereinafter APPROACH TO REGULATION].
10
See SELECT COMMITTEE ON TREASURY, THE MIS-SELLING OF PERSONAL
PENSIONS, 1998, ¶¶ 1–2 (U.K.), available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/
pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmtreasy/712/71203.htm.
11
For detailed discussion of the saga, see generally Gerard McMeel, The
Consumer Dimension of Financial Services Law: Lessons from the Pension Misselling Scandal, 1 COMPANY, FIN., & INSOLVENCY L. REV. 29 (1997); Julia Black &
Richard Nobles, Personal Pensions Misselling: The Causes and Lessons of Regulatory
Failure, 61 M.L.R. 789 (1998); Gerard McMeel, Liability of Financial Advisers in the
Wake of the Pension Mis-selling Scandal, 13 PROF. NEGL. 97 (1997).
12
Rupert Jones, Mis-selling Bill Tops £13bn, GUARDIAN (Dec. 1, 2000),
http://www.theguardian.com/money/2000/dec/02/personalfinancenews.business.
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Payment to salespersons by commission was a cause emphasised
by many commentators. In the House of Lords in Lloyds TSB
General Insurance Holdings v. Lloyds Bank Group Insurance Co.
Ltd.,13 Lord Hoffmann accepted this was one of the key factors,
although putting payment by commission into perspective: “The
underlying reasons for mis-selling were partly the method by
which salesmen were paid but largely the inadequacy of the
training and monitoring of their peformance provided by the
companies employing them.”14
The pension mis-selling scandal was one of the principal
reasons cited for the financial regulatory reforms undertaken by
the Labour Government elected in May 1997. Similar mis-selling
problems were experienced with home income plans or equity
release mortgages marketed to elderly investors. In addition,
there was widespread endowment policy mis-selling in the retail
mortgage sector. The total cost of redress for the industry was £3
billion.15 In 2000, in the wake of Equitable Life’s near-collapse,
“with profits” life insurance products fell under a cloud, and the
issue of compensation for policyholders had rumbled on for more
than a decade. The payment protection insurance (“PPI”) misselling scandal, which embraced banks, credit card companies,
and other credit providers, resulted in £5.9 billion being paid out
in compensation between January 2011 and July 2012, with the
final bill yet to be ascertained.16
The Financial Services
Authority (“FSA”) estimated that the total bill for compensating
consumers for all of these financial scandals was some £15
billion, with the bulk of PPI compensation yet to come.17 Lord
Turner, the Chairman of the FSA, writing in January 2011,
accepted that the regulator’s sales-focused philosophy “has not
been effective in preventing waves of . . . consumer detriment.”18
13
Lloyds TSB Gen. Ins. Holdings v. Lloyds Bank Grp. Ins. Co. Ltd., [2003]
UKHL 48 (appeal taken from Eng. & Wales).
14
Id. ¶ 5.
15
OLIVER WYMAN, MIS-SELLING IN THE UK 7 (2011), available at
https://web.actuaries.ie/sites/default/files/event/2011/07/111020%20ERM%20Forum
%20-%20Daniel%20Mikkelsen.pdf.
16
The FSA published a monthly update on PPI refunds and compensation
payments to date. Monthly PPI Refunds and Compensation, FIN. SERVS. AUTH.,
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/consumerinformation/product_news/insurance/payment_prote
ction_insurance_/latest/monthly-ppi-payouts (last updated Aug. 8, 2013).
17
APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 9, ¶ 1.1.
18
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCUSSION PAPER 11/1: PRODUCT INTERVENTION 3
(2011); see also id. ¶¶ 2.3.4, 5.14; Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.),
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Since then, further concerns have arisen from what the FSA has
determined are serious failings in the sale of interest rate
hedging products by banks to small and medium-sized
businesses, with banks undertaking to review sales and provide
redress where appropriate.19 In July 2012, the London InterBank Offered Rate (“LIBOR”) fixing scandal broke. LIBOR is
used both for setting commercial lending rates and in
determining some U.K. residential mortgage interest rates.
Martin Wheatley, the Managing Director of the FSA and Chief
Executive Officer-designate of the new Financial Conduct
Authority, has been appointed by George Osborne, the
Chancellor of the Exchequer, to conduct a review of the
benchmark rate and how it should be reformed or replaced.20
The “freezing” of wholesale money markets in September
2007 saw the first “run” on a U.K. bank, Northern Rock, since the
Overend and Gurney collapse in the nineteenth century. The
stricken former building society, similar to a Savings & Loan,
was eventually fully nationalized in February 2008.21 More was
to follow later in the year in the wake of the “credit crunch,” with
the near-collapse of the U.K. banking industry averted by
massive capital injections and corporate acquisitions and
restructuring. By January 2009, the Chairman of the FSA, Lord
Turner, observed ruefully: “[T]he world financial system—and
particularly but not exclusively the world banking system—has
suffered a crisis as bad as any since the stock market crashes of
1929 and the various banking crises that followed.”22
In
December 2011, the FSA published its report on the nearSpeech at the British Bankers’ Association Conference: Protecting Consumers and
Winning Trust (July 13, 2010).
19
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., INTEREST RATE HEDGING PRODUCTS: INFORMATION
ABOUT OUR WORK AND FINDINGS 1 (2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/
pubs/other/interest-rate-hedging-products.pdf.
20
HM TREASURY, THE WHEATLEY REVIEW OF LIBOR: INITIAL DISCUSSION
PAPER ¶ 1.1 (2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/
uploads/attachment_data/file/191763/condoc_wheatley_review.pdf; see also Martin
Wheatley, Managing Dir., Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at Bloomberg: Wheatley
Review—The Future of LIBOR (Aug. 10, 2012).
21
See generally Northern Rock plc Transfer Order, 2008, S.I. 2008/432 (U.K.).
The Temporary Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008 has now been replaced by
permanent legislation in the shape of the Banking Act 2009, which has already been
used to rescue the Dunfermline Building Society. See Banking Act 2009, c. 1 (U.K.).
22
Adair Turner, Chairman, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at The Economist’s
Inaugural City Lecture: The Financial Crisis and the Future of Financial Regulation
(Jan. 21, 2009).

FINAL_MCMEEL

600

2/27/2014 6:27 PM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:595

collapse of the Royal Bank of Scotland in October 2008. This
followed its disastrous takeover of ABN-Amro. The bailout
required a £45.5 billion equity capital injection from taxpayers’
funds—a stake now only worth about £20 billion. The report
exposed the multiple failings both at the bank and at the
regulator.
C.

From Multiple Functional Regulators to “Single Regulator”

The regulatory framework for U.K. financial services, which
had developed over the course of the twentieth century, was
complex and fragmented. There were multiple regulators, often
more than one for each of the three sectors of the industry. The
governing legislation and regulatory requirements were
embodied in multifarious statutes, delegated legislative
instruments, codes, and rulebooks. In addition, there existed
various redress mechanisms and safety-net compensation
schemes. The resulting picture was confusing for practitioners,
let alone ordinary consumers. The Labour administration elected
in May 1997 undertook a fundamental overhaul of the financial
regulatory structure in the U.K. and decisively embraced what
was portrayed as a single regulator model in the shape of the
FSA. The Bank of England, the U.K.’s Central Bank, was
stripped of its role as banking regulator by the Bank of England
Act 1998, and the new regulator’s powers were formalized under
the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (“FSMA”).
However the financial crisis of 2007–2008 raised questions about
the role of the supposed “single regulator,” its relationship with
the Bank of England and the Treasury, the U.K.’s finance
ministry—collectively, the so-called “tri-partite authorities.”
Further legislation followed in the wake of the financial crisis,
including the temporary Banking (Special Provisions) Act 2008,
the Banking Act 2009, which superseded the 2008 Act, and the
Financial Services Act 2010.
Over a dozen years after the FSA was initially launched in
1997, and despite the lengthy legislative reform process
culminating in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000,
financial regulatory reform remains high on the agenda. In July
2009, both the then U.K. Labour Government and the
Conservative Party, then Her Majesty’s Loyal Opposition, issued
blueprints for the future. The Labour Government’s 2009 White
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Paper23 was predictably focused on measures in respect of the
banking sector and improved prudential and supervisory
arrangements in the wake of the banking and financial crisis of
20072008.24
It was clear that the Labour Government
continued to regard the system which it had implemented in its
first term—with the FSA as the principal regulator and a
correspondingly reduced role for the Bank of England—as the
appropriate one. The principal proposals in the 2009 White
Paper were for a new Council for Financial Stability to facilitate
cooperation between the Treasury, Bank of England, and
Financial Services Authority, together with a new, explicit
statutory objective for the Financial Services Authority of
maintaining financial stability.25 The Brown administration also
accepted Lord Turner’s conclusion that the Financial Services
Authority had placed too much emphasis on conducting business
regulation at the expense of prudential supervision of the crucial
banking sector.26 However, the proposed technical law reforms
were limited.
These proposals were to a large extent
implemented in the Financial Services Act 2010, which received
the Royal Assent before the May 2010 General Election.
D. The Proposals of the Coalition Government
Whilst in opposition, the Conservative Party, led by David
Cameron, published its own rival and more wide-ranging
proposals on financial regulatory reform (the “Opposition White
Paper”).27 It boldly proposed the abolition of the Financial
Services Authority, the return of prudential regulation of
significant firms by the Bank of England, and a new Consumer
Protection Agency, which, it appears, would embrace the
Financial Services Authority’s conduct of business remit,
together with the consumer credit responsibilities of the Office of

23

REFORMING FINANCIAL MARKETS, supra note 6, at 6.
Id. ¶ 2.1.
25
Id. ¶ 4.29.
26
Id. ¶ 4.58. This point is also emphasized by the Conservatives. See U.K.
CONSERVATIVE PARTY, FROM CRISIS TO CONFIDENCE: PLAN FOR SOUND BANKING 15
(2009), available at http://www.conservatives.com/News/News_stories/2009/07/~/
media/Files/Downloadable%20Files/PlanforSoundBanking.ashx.
27
See U.K. CONSERVATIVE PARTY, supra note 26, at 15.
24
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Fair Trading.28
Essentially this appears to come close to
embracing what is sometimes called the “twin peaks” approach to
financial regulation, with separate regulators focusing on
prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation
respectively.
The formation of a Coalition Government—the first since
World War II—of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats in May
2010, following the General Election, led to promises of further
significant financial regulatory reform. The agreement which
forms the basis of the Coalition Government stated that the
financial regulatory system would be reformed to avoid a repeat
of the financial crisis and that the Bank of England would be
given control of macro-prudential regulation and oversight of
micro-prudential regulation.29 In his first Mansion House speech
on June 16, 2010, new Chancellor of the Exchequer, George
Osborne, confirmed that the Coalition Government did not
believe that the current system of financial regulation was
working.30 He outlined a so-called “twin peaks” strategy—albeit
he did not use that language—for separating prudential
supervision from conduct of business regulation. The Financial
Services Authority would cease to exist in its current form. Mr
Osborne observed: “The FSA became a narrow regulator, almost
entirely focused on rules based regulation.”31 A new Prudential
Regulatory Authority (“PRA”) would operate as a subsidiary of
the Bank of England, which would oversee macro-prudential
policy. A new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority
would be responsible for conduct of business regulation for both
retail and wholesale firms.

28
Under the proposals, the FSA would retain responsibility for both prudential
and conduct of business regulation of 17,000 smaller firms, which are of limited
concern to overall financial stability. Id. at 47.
29
HM GOVERNMENT, THE COALITION: OUR PROGRAMME FOR GOVERNMENT 9
(2010), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach
ment_data/file/78977/coalition_programme_for_government.pdf.
30
Tola Onanuga, Emergency Budget: George Osborne’s Speech in Full,
GUARDIAN (June 22, 2010, 10:27 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2010/jun/22/
emergency-budget-full-speech-text.
31
George Osborne, Chancellor of the Exchequer, Speech at the Lord Mayor’s
Dinner for Bankers & Merchants of the City of London: Check Against Delivery
(June 16, 2010).
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In July 2010, the Treasury published more detailed
proposals in A New Approach to Financial Regulation:
Judgement, Focus and Stability (the “Coalition White Paper”).32
The “tripartite system” whereby the Bank of England, the
Treasury, and the FSA were all collectively and notionally
responsible for financial stability was in part blamed for failings
in the U.K. regulatory framework exposed by the financial crisis.
It confirmed the proposed separation of responsibility for
prudential supervision and conduct of business regulation. A
new Prudential Regulation Authority would have operational
responsibility for prudential regulation and would be a
subsidiary of the Bank of England, which would be responsible
for macro-prudential policy through a new Financial Policy
Committee (“FPC”) and would have oversight of micro-prudential
policy.33 A new Consumer Protection and Markets Authority
(“CPMA”) would be responsible for conduct of business regulation
for both retail and wholesale firms. In the view of the Treasury,
“Prudential and conduct of business regulation require different
approaches and cultures.”34
Chapter Four of the Coalition White Paper provided more
detail on the proposed CPMA.35 It was acknowledged that CPMA
is a working title,36 and in February 2011, the Coalition
Government announced that it had finalized the name for this
body as the Financial Conduct Authority (“FCA”).37 Given that
the CPMA and FCA will be the same corporate entity as the FSA
for cost reasons, as a matter of substance, the FCA appears to be
essentially the FSA, albeit stripped of responsibility for
prudential regulation.38
The Coalition White Paper moots

32
See HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION:
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, 2010, Cm. 7874 (U.K.) [hereinafter JUDGEMENT,
FOCUS AND STABILITY]; see also HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL
REGULATION: A SUMMARY OF CONSULTATION RESPONSES, 2010 (U.K.); HM
TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: BUILDING A STRONGER
SYSTEM, 2011, Cm. 8012 (U.K.) [hereinafter BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM].
33
See JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, at 9–30 (highlighting
the detailed proposals).
34
Id. ¶¶ 1.20, 4.2; see also BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5, ¶ 1.6.
35
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, at 31–39.
36
Id. ¶ 4.3.
37
BUILDING A STRONGER SYSTEM, supra note 32, ¶ 1.10.
38
JUDGEMENT, FOCUS AND STABILITY, supra note 32, ¶ 4.30.
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developing and enhancing the FSA’s own initiative variation of
permission powers as a key regulatory tool of the FCA.39 In
terms of regulatory philosophy some continuity is stressed:
[T]he CPMA will build on the progress recently made by the
FSA towards a more interventionist and pre-emptive approach
to retail conduct regulation. As a starting point, it will adopt
the FSA’s new Retail Conduct of Business Strategy, and it will
continue with initiatives such as the Retail Distribution Review,
Mortgage Market Review, and work on responsible lending.
These initiatives recognise and respond to some of the
distinctive characteristics of retail financial services that call for
a more intrusive approach, such as long-term product payoffs,
product complexity and asymmetry of information between
consumers and producers. This will necessarily be backed by a
strong approach to enforcement to ensure credible deterrence.40

Similarly, continuity is maintained in respect of complaints
and compensation in that the proposals envisage the same roles
for the Financial Ombudsman Service (“FOS”) and the Financial
Services Compensation Scheme (“FSCS”) in the regulatory
picture.41
E.

The Financial Services Act 2012

In June 2011, the Treasury published a further consultation
paper and White Paper attaching a draft Financial Services
Bill,42 or more precisely only the “core provisions needed to give
effect to the reform proposals,” with “many technical and
consequential provisions” not yet drafted.43 Critically, the 2011
White Paper evidenced the Coalition Government’s decision not
to wipe the slate clean and start again, but rather it intended to
amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.44 The
proposed core amending draft legislation was put forward for prelegislative scrutiny. The centerpiece of the new financial services
regime45 is the new Financial Policy Committee (“FPC”), a
committee of the Court of the Bank of England, with overall
responsibility for the financial system and for macro-prudential
39
40
41
42
43
44
45

Id. ¶ 4.24.
Id.
Id. ¶ 4.43.
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5.
Id. ¶ 1.17.
Id. ¶ 1.18.
Id. at 8 fig.1.A.
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policy in particular, “sitting at the apex of the regulatory
architecture.”46 It will be chaired by the Governor of the Bank of
England, and the Chief Executive of the Financial Conduct
Authority will be amongst the members.47 Underneath the FPC,
the new PRA would be a subsidiary of the Bank of England, with
operational responsibility for prudential regulation of larger
firms whose balance sheets make them relevant to the financial
system and its stability as a whole, namely the banks, insurers,
and larger investment firms.48
Lastly, the new FCA will
specialize in conduct of business regulation and promotion of
confidence in financial markets, services, and products.49 Its
proposed new powers embrace the following: “product
intervention” powers, which would permit the FCA to impose
requirements on financial products or even to ban them; an
ability to disclose the commencement of enforcement action; and
improvements to the powers to deal with misleading financial
promotions.50 Broadly speaking, the roles of the FSCS and the
FOS are being retained.51
Between July and December 2011, the draft Financial
Services Bill underwent pre-legislative scrutiny by a “Joint
Committee for the draft Financial Services Bill.”52 Following this
scrutiny, the Treasury published a further consultation
document53 outlining further changes to the draft Bill, including
major changes to the crisis management arrangements between
the Treasury and Bank of England.54 Furthermore, the revised
Bill reflected the decision to transfer consumer credit regulation
to the FCA. The Financial Services Bill was introduced into
Parliament on January 26, 2012, which included significant
changes from the draft Bill to the FCA’s statutory objectives and
its statutory principles of good regulation.
The Bill also
transfered full responsibility for regulation of consumer credit
under the Consumer Credit Act 1974 to the FCA. The Financial

46

Id. ¶ 1.29.
Id. ¶¶ 1.25–.30.
48
Id. ¶¶ 1.31–.38.
49
Id. ¶¶ 1.39–.44.
50
Id. ¶ 1.43; see also APPROACH TO REGULATION, supra note 9, ¶ 4.1.
51
BLUEPRINT FOR REFORM, supra note 5, ¶¶ 2.196–.204.
52
HM TREASURY, A NEW APPROACH TO FINANCIAL REGULATION: SECURING
STABILITY, PROTECTING CONSUMERS, 2012, Cm. 8268, ¶ 1.3 (U.K.).
53
Id. ¶ 1.4.
54
Id. ¶¶ 1.5–.12.
47
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Services Act 2012 received the Royal Assent in December 2012
and therefore passed into law. The Coalition’s aim is for the
latest version of the U.K. financial regulatory system to be
operational during the course of 2013.
F.

The Regulation of Investment Business

Probably as a result of the numerous scandals, stability of
the regulatory environment for U.K. investment business has not
been a feature of the landscape. Prior to the reforms associated
with the so-called “Big Bang” deregulation of the City of London
in the second half of the 1980s, there was a rudimentary regime
represented by the unambitiously-named Prevention of Fraud
(Investments) Acts 1939 and 1958. Since the implementation of
the Financial Services Act 1986 (the “1986 Act”) there have been
several major phases of regulatory rules in respect of investor
protection in the retail financial sector. First, under the 1986
Act, from its implementation on April 29, 1988 to May 1, 1994,
there was the initial regime comprising the regulatory rules of
various Self-Regulatory Organizations (“SROs”), consciously
modeled on the American approach. These SROs included, for
the retail sector, the short-lived duo, the Life Assurance and Unit
Trust Regulatory Organisation (“LAUTRO”)—broadly speaking,
the product providers—and the Financial Intermediaries,
Managers and Brokers Regulatory Association (“FIMBRA”)—
representing the client-facing advisers and brokers. Secondly,
under the same legislation, from 1994 to 2001, an amalgamated
SRO, the Personal Investment Authority (“PIA”) superseded
LAUTRO and FIMBRA but to a large extent adopted its
predecessors’ provisions in its own rulebook. Now product
providers and intermediaries were regulated by the same frontline regulator.
Thirdly, under the Financial Services and
Markets Act 2000 from December 1, 2001 (“N2”) to October 2007,
the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (“COB”)55 component of the
Financial Services Authority’s Handbook of Rules and Guidance
consolidated and superseded its various predecessor regulators’
rulebooks for the conduct of investment business.56 After N2
COB was further amended on a number of fronts, including the

55

See G. MCMEEL & J. VIRGO, FINANCIAL ADVICE AND FINANCIAL PRODUCTS:
LAW AND LIABILITY ch 14 (2001). (discussing the original version of COB).
56
Financial Services and Markets Act, 2000, c. 8 (U.K.).
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depolarization initiative, which permitted intermediaries to be
multi-tied to a defined number of product providers, whereas
previously since the introduction of SRO regimes they had to be
either tied to one provider or wholly independent. In mid-2005,
the FSA proposed fundamental changes to COB.57 The main
impetus came from the need to implement new European law—
the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”)—with
effect from November 1, 2007 and resulting in the new Conduct
of Business Sourcebook (“COBS”) component of the Handbook.58
Lastly, December 31, 2012 saw the implementation of the Retail
Distribution Review (“RDR”), which is this Article’s focus and
which bans payment of commission to intermediaries.
Accordingly, in twenty-five years, from the beginning of 1988 to
the end of 2012, there have been some six significant regulatory
phases for investment firms.
G. The Regulatory Regime Under FSMA
In the FSA’s Handbook of rules and guidance, made under
FSMA, the following propositions are relevant. First, the FSA
Principles for Businesses—PRIN 2.1.1R—Principle 6 states: “A
firm must pay due regard to the interests of its customers and
treat them fairly.”59 Secondly, FSA Principle 8 states: “A firm
must manage conflicts of interest fairly, both between itself and
its customers and between a customer and another client.”60 It
should be noted that while these Principles are FSA rules, they
are, exceptionally, not actionable by private persons under FSMA
section 150.61 The most relevant component to investment
business, including life insurance business, is COBS.

57
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 05/10, REVIEWING THE FSA
HANDBOOK: MONEY LAUNDERING, APPROVED PERSONS, TRAINING AND COMPETENCE,
AND CONDUCT OF BUSINESS 1–9, 37–45, Annex 5 (2005).
58
See Directive 2006/31, art. 1, 2006 O.J. (L 114) (EC) (extending the time limit
for the implementation of MiFID).
59
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., PRINCIPLES FOR BUSINESSES ¶ 2.1.1 (2013).
60
Id.
61
See id. ¶ 3.4.4.
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H. The FSA Handbook Pre-RDR
At a general level, COBS 2.1.1R, which implements article
19(1) of MiFID, provided: “(1) A firm must act honestly, fairly
and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its
client (the client’s best interests rule).”62
More specifically, COBS 2.3.1R, which implements article
26(1) of the MiFID Implementing Directive, provided:
A firm must not pay or accept any fee or commission, or provide
or receive any non-monetary benefit, in relation to designated
investment business . . . other than:
(1) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided
to or by the client or a person on behalf of the client; or
(2) a fee, commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided
to or by a third party or a person acting on behalf of a third
party, if:
(a) the payment of the fee or commission, or the provision of the
non-monetary benefit does not impair compliance with the
firm’s duty to act in the best interests of the client; and
(b) the existence, nature and amount of the fee, commission or
benefit, or, where the amount cannot be ascertained, the
method of calculating that amount, is clearly disclosed to the
client, in a manner that is comprehensive, accurate and
understandable, before the provision of the service . . . or
(3) proper fees which enable or are necessary for the provision of
designated investment business or ancillary services, such as
custody costs, settlement and exchange fees, regulatory levies or
legal fees, and which, by their nature, cannot give rise to
conflicts with the firm’s duties to act honestly, fairly and
professionally in accordance with the best interests of its
clients.63

COBS 2.3 contained a more stringent regime on inducements
and indirect benefits than any previous regulatory regime. Prior
to 2007, the regulators were generally content to say that firms
should consider the implications of general fiduciary law. In
contrast, COBS 2.3 required full disclosure of third-party
commission payments.
It is also provided that any fee,
commission, or non-monetary benefit paid or provided to or by a
third party “must be designed to enhance the quality of the

62
63

Id. ¶ 2.1.1.
Id. ¶ 2.3.1.
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relevant service to the client.”64 In accordance with guidance
from the Committee of European Securities Regulators (“CESR”),
a firm was able to comply with its obligations on inducements so
long as it disclosed the essential arrangements relating to any
fee, commission, or non-monetary benefit in summary form, and
undertook to give further disclosure on request, and honored that
undertaking. The regime was also extended by the FSA to
packaged investment products which fall outside the scope of
MiFID.
Senior Management Arrangements, Systems and Controls
(“SYSC”), in chapter ten of the FSA handbook, includes material
on conflicts of interest, which in a previous incarnation formed
part of the old COB. SYSC 10.1.3R, which implements article
18(1) of MiFID, provided:
A firm must take all reasonable steps to identify conflicts of
interest between:
(1) the firm, including its managers, employees and appointed
representatives (or where applicable, tied agents), or any person
directly or indirectly linked to them by control, and a client of
the firm; or
(2) one client of the firm and another client; that arise or may
arise in the course of the firm providing any service referred to
in SYSC 10.1.1 R.65

Furthermore, SYSC 10.1.4R, which implements article 21(1) of
MiFID Implementing Directive stated:
For the purposes of identifying the types of conflict of interest
that arise, or may arise, in the course of providing a service and
whose existence may entail a material risk of damage to the
interests of a client, a common platform firm and a management
company must take into account, as a minimum, whether the
firm or a relevant person, or a person directly or indirectly
linked by control to the firm:
(1) is likely to make a financial gain, or avoid a financial loss, at
the expense of the client;

64
THE COMM. OF EUROPEAN SEC. REGULATIONS, INDUCEMENTS UNDER MIFID:
RECOMMENDATIONS ¶ 13 (2007) (based on MiFID Implementing Directive,
Commission Directive, 2006/73, art 26(b)(ii), 2006 O.J. (L.241) 26 (EC), fleshing out
MiFID, Directive 2004/39, art 19(1), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1 (EC)).
65
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., SENIOR MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS, SYSTEMS AND
CONTROLS ¶ 10.1.3 (2013).
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(2) has an interest in the outcome of a service provided to the
client or of a transaction carried out on behalf of the client,
which is distinct from the client’s interest in that outcome.66

II. THE RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW
A.

The RDR Discussion Paper

In June 2007, the principal Discussion Paper on the RDR
was published67 and it was originally intended to provide full
feedback in October 2008. However, in August 2008,68 at the
height of the financial crisis, the FSA announced that it would be
November 2008 before any full feedback statement would be
published, principally in the wake of the appointment of Jon Pain
as Managing Director of Retail Markets at the FSA. The original
Discussion Paper attracted some 888 responses and obviously
prompted some significant further thinking at the FSA, as
evidenced by an Interim Report.69
The original Discussion Paper pointed out that, although the
retail investment sector had been regulated for two decades,
numerous features of the industry—complex charging structures,
heavy reliance on commission-based advisers, poor quality advice
going undetected for many years, and limited training of
advisers—suggested an inefficient market. It favored, effectively,
a class-based system of “professional financial planning” for highincome consumers and more basic “primary advice” for the rest.70
The latter regime might include a watering-down of the
suitability regime.71 It was not difficult to foresee that both
European standards required by MiFID and other Directives, not
to say the common law standard of care, might pose obstacles for
this project.72

66

Id. ¶ 10.1.4.
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCUSSION PAPER 07/1: A REVIEW OF RETAIL
DISTRIBUTION (2007) [hereinafter REVIEW OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION].
68
Press Release, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), FSA Announces Change to RDR
Timetable (Aug. 7, 2008), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/library/communication/
pr/2008/088.shtml.
69
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., RETAIL DISTRIBUTION REVIEW—INTERIM REPORT ¶ 24
(2008) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT].
70
REVIEW OF RETAIL DISTRIBUTION, supra note 67, ¶ 20.
71
Id. ¶ 22.
72
Id. ¶¶ 5.32–.35.
67
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RDR Interim Report

In April 2008, in the Interim Report,73 perhaps driven by the
relatively large consultative response—presumably industryled—the FSA conceded that there was a consensus among
respondents that its original proposals were too complex. And it
appeared sympathetic to consultees’ calls for a “simpler
landscape” with a clear distinction between “advice” and “sales.”74
It now favored only one species of adviser, coupled with a “stepchange in the standards required of advisers.”75 All would be
independent, whole of market advisers whose remuneration was
set without product provider input. Professional or educational
standards would be increased. In contrast, “sales” would be
strictly non-advised, in the form of either execution-only or
guided sales in the context of wider government initiatives to
promote more saving and investment. Again it was easy to
foresee significant obstacles ahead of this anticipated terrain,
from both European and domestic legal constraints.
Furthermore, the long-standing lack of clarity in the consumer
financial services context between giving advice and providing
information does not look capable of swift resolution,76 and the
widespread incidence of supposedly “execution-only” transactions
in the earlier pensions and endowment mis-sales episodes should
not be forgotten. In addition, in this Interim Report, as a first
step, the FSA exhorts product providers to drop out of their
traditional role of remunerating advisers, and regulated firms
generally are prodded in the direction of common professional
standards.
C.

The FSA Feedback: The Death Knell for Commission-Driven
Sales

In November 2008, the FSA eventually provided its feedback
and mapped out the future, in which the RDR spawned the
“Retail Distribution Implementation Programme” (“RDIP”),
rolling forward to the end of 2012.77 A clearer distinction will be

73

INTERIM REPORT, supra note 69.
Id. ¶ 5 (internal quotation marks omitted).
75
Id.
76
Id. ¶ 4.9.
77
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., FEEDBACK STATEMENT 08/6, RETAIL DISTRIBUTION
REVIEW—INCLUDING FEEDBACK ON DP07/1 AND THE INTERIM REPORT ¶ 17 (2008).
74
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drawn between “independent advice” and “sales advice.”78
However, any attempt to draw a clear distinction between sales
and advice has been dropped following discussions with the
European Commission that confirmed that the proposed simpler
landscape proposal would be inconsistent with MiFID.79
Crucially, product providers were to be removed from a role in
intermediary remuneration.
This was the death knell of
commission-driven (mis)sales. In the words of Jon Pain: “This is
the end of the potential for commission bias.”80 Dan Waters, the
FSA’s Director of Retail Policy and Conduct Risk, was even more
emphatic: “[T]hese rules will bring to an end the current practice
in the UK of product providers offering adviser firms amounts of
commission for selling their products.”81
D. Implementing the RDR
At the end of June 2009, the FSA published its consultation
paper on delivering the RDR, including draft Handbook text.82
Despite the proclaimed commitment to greater clarity in the way
in which firms describe their services to consumers, the FSA
itself—having flirted with suggested distinctions between
“professional financial planning” and “primary advice,” “advice”
and “sales,” and “independent advice” and “sales advice”—
eventually settled upon “independent advice” and “restricted
advice.”83 Long-standing observers of the retail investment
industry may detect a hint of “repolarization” after “polarization”
and “depolarization.” Crucially, all investment advice firms must
set their own charges, with product providers being banned from
offering commission to secure sales.84 The intended scope of the
new regime embraces not just the traditional “packaged
products” but also unregulated collective investment schemes, all

78

Id. ¶ 3.9.
Id. ¶ 13.
80
Jon Pain, Managing Dir. of Retail Mkts., Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), Speech at
the FSA Distribution Review Seminar, Edinburgh: The Retail Distribution Review—
The Key to Our Retail Strategy (Jan. 15, 2009).
81
Dan Waters, Dir. of Retail Policy & Conduct Risk, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.),
Speech at ABI Conference: The Retail Distribution Review—Practical Challenges for
the Investment Industry (Jan. 16, 2009).
82
FIN. SERVS. AUTH., CONSULTATION PAPER 09/18, DISTRIBUTION OF RETAIL
INVESTMENTS: DELIVERING THE RDR (2009).
83
Id. at chs. 23.
84
Id. at ch. 4.
79
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holdings in investment trusts, and structured investment
products.85 Consideration is also being given to rolling out the
same approach for general insurance and mortgage products.86
E.

COBS After the RDR

The principal new rules are found in COBS 6.1A for all firms
providing advice to retail clients, that is, intermediaries. In
particular, COBS 6.1A.4R provides:
[A] firm must:
(1) only be remunerated for the personal recommendation (and
any other related services provided by the firm) by adviser
charges; and
(2) not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates
solicits or accepts) any other commissions, remuneration or
benefit of any kind in relation to the personal recommendation
or any other related service, regardless of whether it intends to
refund the payments or pass the benefits on to the retail client;
and
(3) not solicit or accept (and ensure that none of its associates
solicits or accepts) adviser charges in relation to the retail
client’s retail investment product which are paid out or advanced
by another party over a materially different time period, or on a
materially different basis, from that in or on which the adviser
charges are recovered from the retail client.87

COBS 6.1B.5R then bans providers and platforms from
making such payments:
[A] firm must not offer or pay (and must ensure that none of its
associates offers or pays) any commissions, remuneration or
benefit of any kind to another firm, or to any other third party
for the benefit of that firm, in relation to a personal
recommendation (or any related services), except those that
facilitate the payment of adviser charges from a retail client’s
investments in accordance with this section.88

Lastly, from December 31, 2012, COBS 2.3.1R(2)(c) extended
to general insurance business, meaning non-life business, a rule
that a payment to or benefits conferred upon an intermediary by
an insurer must “enhance the quality of the service provided to

85
86
87
88

Id. ¶ 1.5.
Id. ¶ 1.7 & ch. 6.
CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 6.1.A.4.
Id. ¶ 6.1.B.5.
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the client,” in addition to the existing “best interests” rule.89 New
guidance at COBS 2.3.16A G suggests that an agreement may
break rules if it provides a key source of income for a distributor.
F.

The Regulator Flexes Its Muscles

In the run-up to implementation of the RDR, on October 1,
2012, a senior regulator from the FSA—the Head of the Life
Insurance Department, Conduct Business Unit—wrote to the
CEOs of the largest providers of retail investment products and
largest distributors. These providers included life insurers, large
independent financial intermediary firms, and networks of
independent financial advisers. The letter announced: “We are
concerned that some firms may be looking for ways to circumvent
the adviser charging rules by soliciting or providing payments
that do not look like traditional commission, but are generally
intended to achieve the same outcome.”90 It lamented that such
arrangements were “not in the spirit of the RDR.”91 Such
arrangements are to be found in the intermediary contracts or
“distribution agreements” between provider firms and distributor
firms—that is, client-facing advisory firms.92 The FSA renewed
its threat to supervise heavily in an attempt to detect attempted
circumventions of the new regime. The FSA formally sought
confirmation that all distribution agreements of the targeted
firms complied with the existing COBS 2.3 and the incoming new
rules, COBS 6.1A, for all firms providing advice to retail clients,
and COBS 6.1B, for providers and platforms, together with other,
unpublished information.
The FSA instanced three examples of inducements which
caused it concern: first, contributions by provider firms to the
costs of a distributor firm’s training or conference events,
including lavish social benefits unrelated to training—no more
cakes and ale; second, payments by a provider to a distributor for
“assistance” with promoting the provider’s products—these
payments had to reflect the actual costs incurred by the

89

Id. ¶ 2.3.1(2)(c).
Letter from Nick Poyntz-Wright, Head of Life Insurance Department,
Conduct Business Unit, Fin. Servs. Auth. (U.K.), to the CEOs of a Sample of Life
Insurers and Networks/IFAs (Oct. 1, 2012), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/static/
pubs/guidance/rdr-inducements-rules.pdf.
91
Id.
92
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
90
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distributor firm in promoting the services; third, payments to a
distributor to update IT hardware and software. The FSA had
had sight of five-year agreements providing IT support with
sizeable payments being made in advance of December 31, 2012.
These practices could offend the existing regime by encouraging a
breach of the “best interests” rule, especially where the payments
constitute a significant source of income for the distributor and
might involve a breach of the rules requiring disclosure to clients
of permitted inducements.93 In addition, such practices could
breach the new regime under COBS 6.1A, for all firms providing
advice to retail clients, and COBS 6.1B, for providers and
platforms. Large up-front payments on the eve of the RDR might
be apportioned across the length of the distribution contract.
III. U.K. FIDUCIARY LAW
A.

Who Is a Fiduciary Under English Law?

The law governing fiduciaries under English law pre-dates
and co-exists with the regulatory law described above. Much of
the remuneration of financial intermediaries, who were
notionally the agents of the investor and therefore owed them
fiduciary duties, was difficult to reconcile with equitable
principles.
The core requirement for the recognition of a
fiduciary obligation is an assumption of responsibility for the
property or affairs of another. The paradigm of the disinterested
management of the affairs of another is the prime example of
fiduciary responsibility, the trustee.94 In addition, the agent
constituted another status-based example of the fiduciary
regime.95 In the leading modern English authority of Bristol &
West Building Society v. Mothew,96 Lord Justice Millett stated:
It is obvious that not every breach of duty by a fiduciary is a
breach of fiduciary duty . . . [b]reach of fiduciary obligation,
therefore, connotes disloyalty or infidelity. Mere incompetence

93
94
95

CONDUCT OF BUSINESS SOURCE BOOK, supra note 4, ¶ 2.3.9.
The seminal case is Keech v. Sandford, (1726) 25 Eng. Rep. 223.
Logicrose Ltd. v. Southend United Football Club Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256

(Eng.).
96

[1998] Ch. 1 (Eng.).
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is not enough. A servant who loyally does his incompetent best
for his master is not unfaithful and is not guilty of a breach of
fiduciary duty.97

It is only the second type of duty, that of loyalty, which is the
true fiduciary obligation. As Lord Justice Millett observed in
Bristol & West Building Society:98
A fiduciary is someone who has undertaken to act for or on
behalf of another in a particular matter in circumstances which
give rise to a relationship of trust and confidence. The
distinguishing obligation of a fiduciary is the obligation of
loyalty. The principal is entitled to the single-minded loyalty of
his fiduciary.99

If the core obligation of the fiduciary is loyalty, a paradigm of
breach of fiduciary duty is non-disclosure. The relationship
between a fiduciary and his or her principal is one of the two
main exceptions in English law to the rule that, in contractual
transactions, there is no general duty to disclose material facts.
As a general rule, if the fiduciary makes full disclosure of all the
circumstances surrounding a transaction to the principal and the
principal gives informed consent to the dealings by the fiduciary,
a transaction will stand.
B.

The Obligations of the Fiduciary

The obligations of the fiduciary stemming from the core
principle of loyalty are multi-faceted, as recognized by Lord
Justice Millett in Bristol & West Building Society:100
This core liability has several facets. A fiduciary must act in
good faith; he must not make a profit out of his trust; he must
not place himself in a position where his duty and his interest
may conflict; he may not act for his own benefit or the benefit of
a third person without the informed consent of his principal.
This is not intended to be an exhaustive list, but it is sufficient
to indicate the nature of fiduciary obligations. They are the
defining characteristics of the fiduciary.101

97

Id. at 16, 18.
Id. at 18.
99
Id.
100
Id. (followed in a Singapore case, Ng Eng Ghee v. Mamata Kapildev Dave,
[2009] 3 S.L.R. 109 [135]).
101
Bristol, [1998] Ch. 1 at 16.
98
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In the context of financial services, the payment and receipt
of wholly secret commissions to a fiduciary is a clear breach of
the principle of loyalty. Equity deploys a very full armory of
remedies against both the recipient of a bribe or secret
commission and the payor of the bribe.
In the context of financial services, it has recently been a
regulatory requirement to disclose the receipt of commission, as
discussed above. In any event, equity has always maintained a
stringent prohibition of the practice of secret commissions. The
motive of the fiduciary is irrelevant. It is conclusively presumed
that he has acted corruptly. The only defense is if it can be
shown that the payment was made with the full, informed
consent of the principal.
C.

Remedies for Receipt of Secret Commissions

The following remedies are available to the principal in cases
concerning the receipt of a bribe or secret commission. First, any
contract of employment between principal and agent may be
terminated.102 Second, both the fiduciary and the third party
paying the bribe or secret commission are jointly liable for
damages in fraud, in the same measure as in the tort of deceit.103
The damages will be at least the amount of the secret
commission, but if the principal can prove additional loss—for
example, paying too much or receiving too little under the
resulting contract with the payor of the secret commission—that
too can be recovered. Third, the principal may rescind any
contract which resulted between himself and this third party.104
Fourth, the principal can claim the amount of the bribe or secret
commission as money had and received from the fiduciary105 and
also from the briber.106 Fifth, the legitimate commission paid by
the principal to the fiduciary will be forfeited.107

102

Bos. Deep Sea Fishing & Ice Co. v. Ansell, (1888) 39 Ch.D. 339, 357–58

(Eng.).
103
Logicrose Ltd. v. Southend United Football Club Ltd., [1988] 1 W.L.R. 1256,
126364 (Eng.).
104
Id. at 1260.
105
Lister & Co v. Stubbs, (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, 6 (Eng.).
106
Arab Monetary Fund v. Hashim, [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 543, 564–45 (Eng.).
107
Imageview Mgmt. Ltd. v. Jack, [2009] EWCA (Civ) 63 [22] (Eng.) (citing
Ansell, 39 Ch.D. at 353; Andrews v. Ramsay & Co., [1903] 2 K.B. 635, 637–38 (U.K.);
and Rhodes v. Macalister [1923] 29 Com. Cas. 19, 25 (Eng.).
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Lastly, at one point, it appeared to be accepted in English
law that a personal claim in money had and received may be
reinforced by a proprietary claim on the basis of a constructive
trust, at least against the fiduciary.108 However, in 2011 the
Court of Appeal decisively insisted that the claim was purely
personal and not proprietary.109
Not all of the above remedies can be accumulated. The
principal may recover the amount of the bribe or secret
commission only once, from either the briber or the fiduciary.
Furthermore, the principal must elect between a compensatory
claim for fraud and a restitutionary claim for the amount of the
bribe.110 In the context of financial services, the availability of
these various remedies for the payment of bribes and secret
commissions has always been available in principle, although it
does not appear to have been tested in the reported cases. It
further seems clear that attempts to disclose the existence of a
commission by referring to it in documentation may not be
sufficient if this does not achieve the full, informed consent of the
principal.111
D. Disgorgement of Commission and Other Secret Benefits
Financial advisers and insurance intermediaries are usually
the agents of the customers and are therefore in a fiduciary
relationship with them. Given that much business has generally
been commission-driven, with the agent receiving often
substantial financial benefits from a third party, it would appear
to be a trite application of fiduciary law that an agent must
either disclose the existence of the proposed commission
arrangement in advance to the customer—his principal—or else
be liable for a claim for disgorgement of that benefit by the
customer. However, it is difficult to find a clear statement of this
principle in the financial services context.
108
Attorney Gen. for H.K. v. Reid, [1994] 1 A.C. 324, 336 (P.C.) (appeal taken
from N.Z.) (U.K.) (disapproving Lister & Co v. Stubbs, (1890) 45 Ch.D. 1, 15 (Eng.)).
109
Sinclair Invs. (UK) Ltd. v. Versailles Trade Fin. Ltd., [2011] EWCA (Civ)
347, [72][73] (Eng.) (citing Lister, 45 Ch.D. at 15). But see generally FHR European
Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013] EWCA (Civ) 17 [33] (Eng.), especially the
judgment of Sir Terence Etherton Chancellor.
110
Mahesan S/O Thambiah v. Malay. Gov’t Officers’ Coop. Hous. Soc’y Ltd.,
[1979] A.C. 374, 38283 (P.C.) (U.K.).
111
For consideration of regulatory duties in respect of payment of commission,
see discussion, supra Part II.E.
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Application to Financial Intermediaries

One example of the stringency of the fiduciary requirement
is Seymour v. Ockwell.112 An independent financial adviser
(“IFA”) recommended an offshore fund of a company called
Imperial Consolidated—a fraudulent investment scheme—which
was held in an Allied Dunbar Isle of Man offshore life policy
“wrapper bond” in the Isle of Man.113 The IFA received £2,500
from Allied Dunbar, which was properly disclosed by the IFA to
the investors in that case, and the claim in respect of that sum
was dropped at trial.114
However, in addition, Imperial
Consolidated paid a “marketing allowance” of £4,850 to the IFA,
of which the IFA was unaware at the time of the initial
recommendation—albeit that the IFA became aware of it while
the investment could have been reversed during the “cooling-off”
period.115 It was not disclosed until some four months after the
transaction. His Honour Judge Havelock-Allen QC rejected a
submission that the “marketing allowance” of £4,850 was not a
commission: “Plainly this was a commission whatever label was
attached to it.”116 It was further submitted that the payment fell
outside the mischief covered by the then relevant FIMBRA
rules,117 which required such payments to be disclosed in writing
before the client signed any proposal. It was accepted that the
adviser could not disclose a payment of which she was unaware
when the contract was signed. Nevertheless, His Honour Judge
Havelock-Allen QC continued:
But Mr McMeel [counsel for the investors] put the case more
generally. In his submission a person (such as Miss Ockwell)
who is under a fiduciary obligation must account to the person
to whom the obligation is owed not only for any benefit or gain
obtained or received in circumstances where a conflict of
interest might exist but also for any benefit or gain obtained or

112
[2005] EWHC 1137 (Q.B.) (U.K.). For the benefits obtained by the Zurich
broker consultant of a “free week’s holiday in New Orleans” as a result of the
investment, see id. [57], and the judge’s comments, see id. [73].
113
Id. [20].
114
Id. [186].
115
Id.
116
Id. [188].
117
Pers. Inv. Auth., PIA Rulebook, ch. 12, Rule F29.9, available at
http://hb.betterregulation.com/external/PIAA%20%7C%20Chapter%2012%20of%20t
he%20PIA%20Rulebook.pdf (material interests and conflicts of interest); id. Rule
F29.10 (disclosing commission).
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received by reason of his fiduciary position. Even if there was
no conflict of interest, because Miss Ockwell did not know of,
and ex hypothesi could not have been influenced by, the
marketing allowance, the allowance was remuneration obtained
by reason of her position as the claimants’ financial advisor.
She is liable to account for it and she can only keep it if it was
promptly disclosed and Mr and Mrs Seymour have expressly or
by implication consented to her keeping it. I think that this
submission is correct.118

As a matter of fact the allowance was not promptly disclosed
and it was not argued that the customer had consented. If
necessary, the judge would have held it was earned in
circumstances in which there was the possibility of a conflict of
interest, because the adviser learned of it during the cancellation
period when Mr. and Mrs. Seymour were seeking reassurance
about the wisdom of the investment. It should have been
disclosed before making further recommendations to continue
with the contract.119
This case is probably the clearest
illustration of the application of fiduciary law in this context.
Obviously, it concerned the liability of the fiduciary agent and
not the paying fund, which was hopelessly insolvent.
F.

What Is a Bribe?

What makes a secret commission a bribe? Essentially, a
corrupt purpose does. In Anangel Atlas Compania Naviera S.A.
v. Ishikawagima-Ahrima Heavy Industries Co. Ltd.,120 Mr.
Justice Leggatt said: “[I]t may be said that a bribe consists in a
commission or other inducement which, is given by a third party
to an agent as such, and which is secret from his principal.”121
According to Lord Justice Romer in Hovenden & Sons v. Millhoff,
If a gift be made to a confidential agent with the view of
inducing the agent to act in favour of the donor in relation to
transactions between the donor and the agent’s principal and
that gift is secret as between the donor and the agent—that is
to say, without the knowledge and consent of the principal—
then the gift is a bribe in the view of the law.122

118
119
120
121
122

Seymour, [2005] EWHC [188].
Id. [189].
[1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 167 (Q.B.) (Eng.).
Id. at 171.
[1900] All E.R. Rep. 848 (Eng.).
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G. Two Categories of Commission Payments: “Wholly Secret”
Commissions and Inadequate Disclosure
A highly significant decision of the Court of Appeal in 2007
has further developed the rules on commissions paid to agents in
the related context of regulated consumer credit agreements, and
in particular, what appears to have a “sub-prime,” non-status
loan arranged through a credit broker. In Hurstanger Ltd. v.
Wilson,123 the Court of Appeal distinguished two new subcategories of commissions paid to agents by third parties: first,
“wholly secret” commissions; and, second, cases of limited but
inadequate disclosure.124
The defendants, a co-habiting couple, were in arrears with
their mortgage and sought a further loan of £8,000 through a
local credit broker, Mr. Dunk, who was trading as One Way
Finance.125 The aim was to pay off arrears of £5,500 under the
mortgage, reimburse the broker his £1,000 fee, with the modest
balance left to provide surplus funds for the couple.126 The loan
was ultimately provided by the claimant lender.127 One of a
number of documents which the couple signed included the
statement: “The broker who assisted us in making this loan
application is acting as our agent and is not tied in any way
whatsoever to the company [the lender].
In certain
circumstances this company does pay commission to
brokers/agents.”128 When the loan was made, in addition to the
agreed £1,000 fee, the lender also paid the broker a commission
of £240.129 Evidence was given on behalf of the lender that the
tertiary or non-status lending market was highly competitive and
that it had become necessary for small lenders to pay
commissions to brokers to attract business.130 The recorder found
that there was nothing unusual about the circumstances
surrounding the payment of the commission or its amount, three
percent of the loan.131 He rejected a submission that the loan was
123

Hurstanger Ltd. v. Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) 299 (Eng.).
Id. [38]–[39]; see also FHR European Ventures LLP v. Mankarious, [2013]
EWHC (Civ) 17 (Eng.).
125
Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [2].
126
Id.
127
Id. [5].
128
Id. [4].
129
Id. [5].
130
Id. [30].
131
Id. [31].
124
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void by reason of payment of a secret commission.132 Both parties
appealed based on aspects of the Consumer Credit Act 1974
regime, which are not relevant, and the defendants sought leave
to appeal in respect of the commission issue.
Lord Justice Tuckey gave the only reasoned judgment in the
Court of Appeal. Lord Justices Waller and Jacob agreed.
Permission to appeal was granted at the start of the hearing on
the secret commission issue. Lord Justice Tuckey observed:
The defendants retained the broker to act as their agent for a
substantial fee. The contract of retainer contained the usual
implied terms, but the relationship created was obviously a
fiduciary one. As a fiduciary the agent was required to act
loyally for the defendants and not put himself into a position
where he had a conflict of interest. Yet he agreed that he would
be paid a commission by the other party to the transaction
which his clients had retained him to procure. By doing so he
obviously put himself into a position where he had a conflict of
interest. The defendants were entitled to expect him to get
them the best possible deal, but the broker’s interest in
obtaining a further commission for himself from the lender gave
him an incentive to look for the lender who would give him the
biggest commission.133

The law as laid down by the Court of Appeal can be
described in a number of propositions. First, where an agent
receives commission from a third party without the informed
consent of his principal, he, the agent, is in breach of fiduciary
duty.
Second, informed consent means consent with full
knowledge of all the material circumstances and of the nature
and extent of the agent’s interest. Third, the third party, here
the lender, who pays the commission is an accessory to the
breach and is liable as such. Fourth, whether there had been
sufficient disclosure to secure the principal’s consent is a
question of fact in each case, bearing in mind that what is
required is informed consent to the agent acting despite a
potential conflict of interest. Fifth, the burden of proving full
disclosure lies on the agent, or in appropriate cases, the third
party. Sixth, it is generally not sufficient for the agent to state
that he has an interest or to make a statement which would
merely put the principal on inquiry. Seventh, it is no defense to
132
133

Id.
Id. [33].
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prove that had the agent asked for the principal’s consent it
would have been given.134 Eighth, where the principal was likely
to be vulnerable and unsophisticated, the duty of disclosure
extended to disclosure of the actual amount of commission he
was to receive.135
Ninth, there are two categories of cases: (a) Where there had
been no disclosure at all, receipt of a secret commission, or bribe,
was a blatant breach of fiduciary duty and amounted to a special
category of fraud in which it is unnecessary to prove motive,
inducement, or loss up to the amount of the bribe. The principal
has alternative remedies against both briber and agent for
money had and received in the amount of the bribe or damages
for fraud in respect of the actual loss sustained.136 In addition,
the transaction between briber and principal is voidable at the
election of the principal, provided counter-restitution can be
made.137 (b) There was also a “half-way house” between full
disclosure and secrecy: where there is partial or inadequate
disclosure, which is sufficient to negate secrecy. The second
category is where there has been some disclosure, but it is
inadequate in failing to disclose the amount or to make it clear
that the principal is being asked to consent. Nevertheless, in
such cases there is a breach of fiduciary duty, but the defendants
“are not entitled to deploy the full armoury of remedies which
would have been available if this had been a true secret
commission case.”138
Tenth, the court has discretion whether or not to grant
rescission.139 Eleventh, the principal has a claim against the
third party who procured the breach of fiduciary duty for
equitable compensation in the amount of the bribe, which
mirrors the common law right to claim the return of the bribe as

134
The first seven propositions in paragraphs 34 and 35 of the judgment draw
heavily on BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY ¶¶ 6-05557 (William Bowstead &
F.M.B. Reynolds eds., 18th ed. 2006).
135
Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [36] (glossing the more tentative statement in
BOWSTEAD & REYNOLDS ON AGENCY, supra note 134, ¶ 6-084).
136
Wilson, [2007] EWCA (Civ) [37] (citing Mahesan S/O Thambiah v. Malay.
Gov’t Officers’ Coop. Hous. Soc’y Ltd., [1979] A.C. 374, 383 (P.C.) (U.K.)).
137
Id. (citing Pan. & S. Pac. Tel. Co. v. India Rubber, Gutta Percha & Tel.
Works Co., (1875) 10 Ch. App. 515, 527, 532–33 (Eng.)).
138
Id. [44].
139
Id. [45] (citing Johnson v. EBS Pensioner Trs. Ltd., [2002] EWCA (Civ) 164
[74] (Eng.)).
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money had and received.140
Twelfth, where the award of
equitable compensation was adequate to compensate the
principal fully, it would usually have been unfair and
disproportionate to rescind the contract between third party and
principal, notwithstanding questions of counter-restitution.141
Lord Justice Tuckey made clear what was required in this
particular context: “Borrowers like the defendants coming to the
non-status lending market are likely to be vulnerable and
unsophisticated. A statement of the amount which their broker
is to receive from the lender is, I think, necessary to bring home
to such borrowers the potential conflict of interest.”142
Here, there had been sufficient disclosure, through the
signed documents, to negate secrecy.
However, it was
inadequate in failing to disclose the amount or to make it clear
that the principal was being asked to consent, in circumstances
where the broker was not in a position to give unbiased advice.
Accordingly, informed consent had not been given.143 On the
facts of the instant case, the lender, which had paid the
commission, was guilty of procuring the agent’s breach of
fiduciary duty and was ordered to pay equitable compensation in
the amount of the commission, namely £240 plus interest.144
However, it was held that it would be unfair and
disproportionate to order rescission of the resulting loan.145
Where an independent financial adviser or other agent or
broker owes fiduciary duties to a customer, Hurstanger Ltd. v.
Wilson makes it clear that the obligation of full disclosure of
commissions and other payments may be an extensive one. It is
critical that some kind of warning of the potential conflict, which
the proposed, payment poses for the agent, is spelled out in
appropriate cases, and that the need for the principal to give
consent is made clear, and presumably that the principal has a
choice. The case leaves room for potential differentiation of
different classes of customer, with potentially sophisticated
investors or market counterparties requiring only brief disclosure
of commission but with a regime of full disclosure for at least

140
141
142
143
144
145

Id. [46].
Id. [48].
Id. [36].
Id. [38].
Id. [49].
Id. [48].
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vulnerable consumers, perhaps extending to all retail clients.
Hurstanger also makes it clear that product providers and others
who make the commission payments are equally in the frame,
and in extreme cases, like of total secrecy, are subject to having
the resulting transaction rescinded.
H. Application to Sophisticated Investors
The situation is likely to be different if the investors are
either high net worth individuals or sophisticated investors or
both. Contrast the vulnerable, needy, sub-prime borrowers in
Hurstanger. Such investors may be said to know that IFAs
receive commission and often large sums of commission for their
advice and services. This can be illustrated by a decision handed
down in early 2012 by the Hong Kong Court of First Instance.
In Hobbins v. Royal Skandia Life Assurance Ltd.,146 the
plaintiff investor was a wealthy and successful businessman with
a string of directorships and various overseas properties.147 The
first defendant was a life insurer and provider of life policy-based
investment products.148 The second defendant (“Clearwater”)
was an independent financial adviser and insurance broker.149
Mr. Hobbins entered into a number of investments on the advice
of Clearwater, which disclosed in writing from the outset that it
would charge him no fees but that it would be remunerated by
commissions payable by life insurers and product providers, such
Mr. Hobbins signed client agreements
as Skandia.150
acknowledging this state of affairs.151 Ultimately, Mr. Hobbins
was dissatisfied with the performance of his Skandia investment
following the global financial crisis and brought proceedings
alleging fraud, conspiracy, and breaches of duty by Clearwater
for which he alleged Skandia was responsible.152 His claim was
dismissed.153

146

Hobbins v. Royal Skandia Life Assurance Ltd., [2012] 1 H.K.L.R.D. 977
(C.F.I) (H.K.).
147
Id. [8].
148
Id. [13].
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id. [16].
152
Id. [3][6].
153
Id. [138].
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While the payment by commission was disclosed, the critical
fact was that the amount of the commission was not. The
allegations of fraud and conspiracy were groundless and Mr.
Hobbins was ordered to pay the defendants’ legal costs on the full
or “indemnity” basis in accordance with the “English rule” of
costs-shifting. Justice Reyes was unequivocal that Clearwater
was Mr. Hobbins’s agent, and not the agent of Skandia, as the
agreement between Skandia and Clearwater made clear, and
there was no allegation of ostensible or apparent authority.154
The judge rejected an argument that the payment involved an
illegal and criminal violation of the Hong Kong Prevention of
Bribery Ordinance.155 Justice Reyes was clear that there was
“lawful authority” for the payments based on a century of
English common law authority that commission paid to an
insurance broker by the insured “does not constitute an illegal
secret profit unless it is in excess of what is normally paid within
the insurance market.”156 Interestingly, it was argued that the
Hong Kong Prevention of Bribery Ordinance had changed the
common law when enacted in 1971 and that the recent
developments in the U.K. under the RDR and in Australia under
the Corporations Amendment (Further Future of Financial
Advice Measures) Act 2011 were only just catching up with the
law in Hong Kong. That submission was emphatically rejected.
Nothing in the text or background of the legislation supported
the submission: “One would not expect the legislature to
overturn a long line of case law in a highly oblique and casual
manner.”157
Justice Reyes distinguished the Canadian Supreme Court
case of R v. Kelly158 and appeared in any event to prefer the
reasoning of Justice McLachlin, who did not consider the
disclosure of the amount of commission, to the reasoning of
Justice Cory, who had insisted on the full disclosure of the
nature, amount, and source of commission payments in the
criminal context.
In that case, a financial planner sold
residential units and was rewarded by both purchasers and the

154

Id. [58][60].
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, (2005) Cap. 201, § 17 (H.K.); Hobbins, 1
H.K.L.R.D. [75]]76].
156
Hobbins, 1 H.K.L.R.D. [79][80] (internal quotation marks omitted).
157
Id. [86].
158
[1992] S.C.R. 170 (Can.).
155
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vendor, but there had only been vague references to “costs” in the
extensive documentation.159
Justice Reyes was able to
distinguish the case as one where there was no meaningful,
unequivocal disclosure that any commission was being paid at
all.
There was passing reference to, but no analysis of,
Hurstanger Ltd. v. Wilson. It is noteworthy that Justice Reyes
commented: “The practice of insurers paying commission to
insurance brokers may or may not be unsound. It ought possibly
to be strictly regulated or even prohibited altogether. I express
no view on the matter. That is a question of policy best left to the
legislature, not the Court, to tackle.”160
CONCLUSION
Following years of financial product mis-selling on a vast
scale and huge levels of consumer detriment—and the
consequential massive cost to banks and financial institutions in
handling consumer complaints and paying compensation—the
U.K. financial regulatory system has finally determined that
commission-driven incentives to intermediaries are at the root of
the problem. Over the course of a decade, the U.K. has moved
from having no regulatory rules on disclosure, to a disclosure
regime and has now decisively embraced a complete ban on the
payment and receipt of commission in the retail investment
context. It remains to be seen how this new regime, in place from
the start of 2013, improves the culture and practice of the
provision of financial advice. A further concern must be the
extent to which the intermediation channels and incentives for
advisers will continue to exist in a purely fee-based remuneration
world. Will investors be willing to pay for investment advice?
Will the U.K. market in retail investment, savings, and life
insurance hold up? Will financial advice and products reach the
people who need it? The outcomes of the U.K.’s prohibition on
commission-rewarded advice will be watched with interest in
other jurisdictions.
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Hobbins, 1 H.K.L.R.D [89].

